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AbsTrAcT
Asking pregnant women to (co)pay for non- 
invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) out of pocket 
leads to unequal access across socioeconomic 
strata. To avoid these social justice issues, first- 
trimester prenatal screening should be publicly 
funded in countries such as the Netherlands, 
with universal coverage healthcare systems 
that offer all other antenatal care services 
and screening programmes free of charge. In 
this reply, we offer three additional reasons 
for public funding of NIPT. First, NIPT may 
not primarily have medical utility for women 
and children, but rather offers relevant 
information and reproductive options, and 
thus serves important autonomy interests of 
women. Second, public funding of NIPT can 
be justified because it results in a reduction of 
collectively borne costs associated with care 
and support for children with chromosomal 
abnormalities. It is important to note that 
this is not an argument for individual women 
to take part in screening or to terminate an 
affected pregnancy. However, it is a legitimate 
argument in policy making regarding funding 
arrangements for screening programmes. 
Finally, public funding would help to amend 
current misunderstandings among pregnant 
women (eg, that they are not at risk), and thus 
to support informed consent for first- trimester 
prenatal screening.
In a recent paper in Journal of Medical 
Ethics, we have shown that policies 
requiring pregnant women to (co)pay for 
non- invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) raise 
financial barriers that will not improve 
informed decision making.1 Also, they 
may exacerbate problems regarding equity 
of access to prenatal screening by dispro-
portionally affecting women of lower 
socioeconomic status.1 In a response, 
Dagmar Schmitz rightfully points out that 
the paper does not, however, provide a 
justification for public funding of NIPT 
tout court.2 Why should NIPT be collec-
tively funded, Schmitz asks, in societies 
that seem to harbour a ‘growing unease’ 
with the introduction of NIPT, which is 
perceived to convey discriminatory 
messages especially about Down syndrome 
and is ‘obviously distressing for some’?
First of all, we are not convinced by 
this version of the expressivist argument; 
an NIPT programme need not express 
negative valuations of people with disabil-
ities. On a personal level, for instance, it 
is perfectly possible to love and cherish 
a child with a disability and, in a subse-
quent pregnancy, to make use of a prenatal 
screening programme aimed at detecting 
same abnormality and even to terminate 
an affected pregnancy. On a societal level, 
likewise, it is not inconsistent to respect 
and value fellow citizens with disabili-
ties and to contribute (eg, financially, by 
paying taxes and healthcare premiums) 
to the provision of care and support for 
them, and at the same time to approve 
of prenatal screening programmes. This 
mirrors an argument by John Harris from 
2001 that having a rational preference for 
one’s children not to be disabled is not the 
same as ‘having a rational preference for 
the non- disabled as persons’.3
Moreover, prenatal screening does not 
aim at preventing the birth of people with 
disabilities in society, but at helping indi-
vidual pregnant women make important 
and highly personal reproductive deci-
sions. Admittedly, these decisions are—
rightfully—limited to dealing with serious 
medical conditions, and often result either 
in termination of pregnancy or in tailoring 
of prenatal and perinatal care provision to 
prevent avoidable harm to the child. The 
programme need not—and should not—
express a preference for a certain course 
of action (ie, termination of pregnancy). 
However, Bjørn Hofmann, among others, 
has pointed out that the aggregate of 
personal decisions about selection might 
still work to consolidate and reinforce 
collective norms and values, and, in this 
case, might lead to a disvaluing of persons 
with disabilities.4 Furthermore, persons 
with disabilities or their parents may feel 
offended by the existence of screening 
programmes. We do not mean to deny 
these concerns. However, they do not 
trump the importance of making NIPT 
available to pregnant women to promote 
reproductive autonomy, and should be 
mitigated in other ways.
We agree with Schmitz that public 
funding for NIPT cannot and should not 
be justified with an appeal solely to its 
medical utility for women or children. 
Pregnant women choose to use NIPT 
not to promote their (mental) health, but 
because it offers relevant information and 
reproductive options. Having a child with 
a chromosomal abnormality undeniably 
has an impact on the lives of mothers 
and other family members, which not all 
mothers are willing or able to take on. The 
decision to either end an affected preg-
nancy or carry it to term, is often a very 
difficult but important life decision. NIPT 
is justified by its medical utility, and more 
so by the autonomy interests of pregnant 
women and their partners. Public funding 
helps to ensure that NIPT is made avail-
able to all pregnant women who wish to 
make use of it, voluntarily, regardless of 
their ability to (co)pay. Needless to say, 
women should be equally free to decline 
screening.
Second, public funding of NIPT can 
be justified because it is likely to save the 
public money. In the Netherlands, an esti-
mated 85% of pregnant women and their 
partners decide to terminate a pregnancy 
when trisomy 21 or Down syndrome has 
been detected and confirmed.5 Although 
a decision to undergo an abortion should 
not be motived by publicly or privately 
incurred costs, it does have financial 
implications for women and for the state. 
This argument is often the ‘elephant in 
the room’ in discussions about funding of 
prenatal screening. In many countries, the 
costs associated with offering NIPT free 
of charge to all pregnant women are likely 
to be less than the costs associated with 
providing medical care and other forms of 
care and support to persons with serious 
congenital disorders and their families. 
Again, money should not be an argument 
for individual women to take part in 
screening or to decline it, or to continue 
an affected pregnancy or to terminate 
it. But it can be a legitimate argument in 
policy making regarding funding arrange-
ments for screening programmes.
Third, public funding may help to 
improve informed decision making and 
restore correct understandings of the 
target group of first- trimester screening 
programmes in countries like the Nether-
lands, with universal coverage healthcare 
systems. As we have argued, funding poli-
cies are not neutral:1 by offering NIPT free 
of charge, the state may be seen to support 
or endorse screening, and, vice versa, by 
requesting a (co)payment, the state may 
be seen to discourage screening or deem 
it unimportant. The latter is of particular 
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concern in our country. In the Netherlands, 
population screening is generally funded 
by the state, and antenatal care, which 
includes prenatal screening for infectious 
diseases and erythrocyte immunisation and 
the anomaly scan at 20 weeks of gestation, 
is fully reimbursed through health insur-
ance. By contrast, women must pay for the 
combined test out of pocket or copay for 
NIPT (both approximately €175).6 Thus, 
the (co)payment requirement sets first- 
trimester screening apart from other ante-
natal care services, including the 20- week 
ultrasound scan, which is offered free at 
the point of care. In addition to other 
factors,7 the (co)payment requirement 
may explain the limited uptake of first- 
trimester screening (approximately a third 
in 2016 with the combined test,8 and 46% 
now that NIPT has been introduced9) as 
compared with the 20- week ultrasound 
(85%).8 It may lead pregnant women to 
conclude that first- trimester screening 
is ‘not necessary’ for them.10 Although 
‘necessity’ (or lack thereof) may not apply 
to prenatal screening, our point is that in 
the Netherlands, women may respond to 
a (co)payment requirement by systemat-
ically underestimating the relevance of 
first- trimester screening, assuming that 
they are not at risk of having a child with 
a disability.10 Otherwise, the test would 
have been offered for free. This assump-
tion is false. The risk of being pregnant 
with a fetus with a trisomy 13, 18 or 
21 may be small and may differ among 
women (for trisomy 21, for instance, it 
increases with age), but it is present for all 
women. Schmitz, too, argues that when 
screening is offered for autonomy inter-
ests, all women stand to benefit equally, 
regardless of a priori risk.
We do believe that NIPT should be 
offered free of charge to all pregnant 
women in countries like the Netherlands, 
which can afford it and have the infra-
structure in place to offer it effectively, 
safely and responsibly.9 Public funding 
of NIPT helps to remove existing incon-
sistencies between first- trimester prenatal 
screening and the 20- week ultrasound, to 
correct misconceptions with regard to the 
relevance of NIPT for pregnant women, 
and, importantly, to make NIPT acces-
sible to less privileged women. Also, it will 
likely be cost- effective. But even if it were 
not cost- effective, public funding of NIPT 
can be justified based on the autonomy 
and social justice interests that it serves.
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